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Do the Poor Benefit from Public Spending?   




This paper shows that public spending on basic services, to wit, primary and 
secondary education and basic health care, benefit the poor; while the non-poor are the 
principal beneficiaries of tertiary and education subsidies and hospital spending.  The 
evidence also shows that expenditures on infrastructure spending tend to benefit the non-
poor disproportionately more than the poor. 
 
1.  DO THE POOR BENEFIT FROM PUBLIC SPENDING?    
A LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE 
Policy-makers are increasingly relying on public expenditures to promote 
economic development. Targeted properly, public expenditures can overcome 
market failures, promote economic growth, increase employment, reduce poverty 
and improve human welfare.  Public spending on education, health and infrastructure 
(e.g. electricity, water and sanitation) services in developing countries is usually 
justified on efficiency and equity grounds, and as an instrument for income 
distribution and poverty reduction.  It is also argued in the literature that better health 
and basic education, and access to safe water and basic infrastructure would 
contribute to economic growth, improve the lot of the poor and their chances for 
employment.  Public spending on health, education and infrastructure services in the 
Caribbean and developing countries has a populist appeal.  However, spending on 
social services can be very expensive which has to be paid for by tax revenues.  The 
prevailing view in developing countries is that public expenditures on education and 
health are “pro-poor” programmes that benefit largely “poor people” and their 
children.  This paper shows that this view is not well-founded.  It should be noted 
that even when social and infrastructure services are publicly provided the poor face 
obstacles (for example, transport costs, the cost of school uniforms, and generally the 
poor are the first to drop out from school to benefit from subsidised public 
education) that limit their access to these services. 
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In their attempt to provide the poor access to these vital services very few 
English speaking Caribbean governments charge for basic educational and health 
services.  Those governments that do, generally charge low fees that are a fraction of 
the cost.  This paper examines how the benefits of public spending on education, 
health and infrastructure services are distributed in the English speaking Caribbean 
countries.  There are two approaches used to measure the value of the benefits of 
publicly subsidised services.1  The first approach emphasises the individual’s own 
valuation of the services provided.  The problem with this approach is to determine 
the individual’s subjective evaluation of what these publicly provided services are 
worth.  The second approach utilises the cost of providing publicly funded services 
with information on their use, and it then estimates how the benefits of these services 
are distributed across the various income distribution groups.  This approach is 
referred to as the benefit-incidence approach.2  This paper uses the benefit-incidence 
approach to show which income groups have been the principal beneficiaries of 
public spending on education, health and infrastructure services in Barbados, 
Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.  However, for comparison, we will draw 
specifically on the experiences of Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and other 
developing countries to illuminate our exposition and to draw conclusions. 
 
2.  BENEFIT-INCIDENCE OF EDUCATION 
Benefit incidence studies have had a “great deal of influence in development 
policy” [van de Walle (1996), p. 6].  Benefit incidence indicates who benefits from 
public services (such as education, health care etc.); it does this by combining 
information about the unit costs of providing those services with information on the 
use of these services [Demery (2003)].  Benefit incidence analysis imputes to those 
households using a particular service the cost of providing that service [Demery 
(2003)], and it assumes that the value to consumers of a public service is equivalent 
to the cost of providing it [van de Walle (1996)].  Despite its influence in policy 
making, benefit-incidence analysis has been subject to a number of limitations.3  
First, the estimated incidence is the average incidence of public spending—it 
describes how existing spending affects the distribution of income; it tells us very 
little about what would happen if there are changes in public spending.  In short, it 
provides a “cross-sectional snapshot” which is not the same “as who would benefit 
from marginal resources devoted to the sector” [World Bank (2003a), p. 221].  
Second the data are limited when it comes to assessing the costs and benefits of each 
 
1See Castro-Leal, et al. (2000) for a discussion of this point.  This paper takes freely from Gafar 
(2005). 
2The World Bank (2001) points out that the benefits-incidence approach is a “well established 
tool” for estimating who benefits from public spending. 
3Most of the limitations listed in the paper are reproduced from the World Bank (2003a) footnote 
140. 
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unit of service provided.  The unit cost of providing a service may have little relation 
to the value of the benefits to the individual, for example, the cost of immunising a 
child is typically small compared to the life long benefits.  Third, benefit-incidence 
analysis assumes that the “value of the expenditure is equal across all users” [World 
Bank (2003a), p. 221], but this ignores the individual evaluation and individual 
preferences.  Then, there is the issue of whether the average (unit) costs can be taken 
as reasonable “proxies” for values [Demery (2003)].  Moreover, if public spending is 
unevenly distributed between urban and rural areas (for example spending on urban 
dwellers might emphasise the provision of quality services) the use of aggregate 
expenditure incidence statistics can ‘mask’ inequality in public spending.  Fourth, 
benefit incidence analysis does not adequately address the issues of service quality 
[Demery (2003)].  Fifth, it is hard to know what a “good” allocation of public 
spending is since the true counterfactual (what the distribution would be in the 
absence of public spending) is not known [Demery (2003)].  
Table 1 presents the quintiles’ shares of beneficiaries of public education 
spending in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.  The data indicate that 
public spending on primary education and school feeding programmes are well 
targeted and progressive.  One of the reasons why poorer households gain a large 
share of primary education subsidy is the fact that they have a disproportionate share 
of primary school-aged children.  Second, the education system in the Caribbean 
does provide access to a large majority of the students up to the secondary level.  
Thirdly, tertiary level education in the Caribbean is regressive in that it mainly 
benefits the two top quintiles of the income distribution.  For the rural teenager, a 
college education is not readily and easily accessible.  The data in Table 1 show that 
in Guyana the top 40 percent of the income distribution received 52 percent of the 
post-secondary education subsidies; in Jamaica the top 40 percent of the wealthiest 
received 78 percent of the subsidies on tertiary education; and in Trinidad and 
Tobago the top 40 percent of the income groups captured 73 percent of the public 
subsidies on university/technical education.   
Public expenditures on education in the Caribbean tend to be allocated 
inequitably, with better education opportunities often provided to urban children 
relative to rural children, and to well-off children relative to poor children [Gafar 
(2001)]. Guyana allocates approximately 45 percent of its education budget on 
primary education, 27 percent on secondary education, 18 percent on university 
education and 10 percent on “other”; Jamaica spends 32 percent of its education 
budget on primary education, 46 percent on secondary education and 22 percent on 
tertiary education; and Trinidad and Tobago allocates 42 percent of its education 
budget on primary education, 32 percent on secondary education and 20 percent on 
tertiary education.  Most of the poor in the Caribbean have a primary education and 
below, and live primarily in the rural areas [Gafar (1998)].  Unit costs are generally 
used as proxies of the benefits that households derive from a particular service.  In 
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terms of unit cost, available data in Tsang, Fryer and Arevalo (2002) suggest that the 
unit cost for secondary education relative to the unit cost for primary education in the 
Caribbean varies from 1.4 to 1.7; in the case of higher versus primary education, the 
data indicate that the equivalent cost of educating one university student in terms of 
the primary level is 13 for Trinidad and Tobago, 18 for Guyana, 11 for Jamaica, and 
3 for Barbados.  In three developed countries (United States, Great Britain, and New 
Zealand) the data in Psacharopoulos (1972, Table 8.2) reveal that the ratio of total 
per-pupil cost of secondary to primary education is 6.6 to 1, and that of higher to 
primary is 17.6 to 1, and in seven developing countries (Malaysia, Ghana, South 
Korea, Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria, India) these relative costs are 11.0 and 87.9 to 1, 
respectively [Todaro (1997)].  In many African countries (Sierra Leone, Malawi, 
Kenya and Tanzania) the ratio of higher to primary education ranges as high as 283 
[Todaro (1997)].  It follows, therefore, that many developing countries are spending 
a very large portion of their educational budgets on a very small proportion of their 
students (i.e., the non-poor) enrolled in higher education, and this is regressive. 
 
Table 1   
Quintiles’ Shares of Public Education Spending in Guyana,  
Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago 
Quintiles 
Country 
 Expenditure in  
    Education I (Poorest) II III IV V 
Guyana1       
 Primary 28.9 24.9 18.5 19.0 8.6 
 Secondary 15.7 24.0 22.0 23.5 14.8 
 Post-Secondary 7.7 12.5 28.0 19.4 32.5 
 Meal at School 23.4 27.1 19.7 21.0 8.8 
 Technical/Vocational 25.6 24.5 22.9 16.4 10.7 
Jamaica2       
 Early Childhood 26.0 23.0 22.0 18.0 11.0 
 Primary 25.0 24.0 21.0 19.0 12.0 
 Secondary 16.0 21.0 22.0 22.0 19.0 
 Tertiary 3.0 11.0 8.0 24.0 54.0 
 Total 22.0 22.0 21.0 20.0 15.0 
Trinidad and Tobago1       
 Primary 30.9 24.0 22.2 15.6 7.3 
 Junior Secondary 29.1 23.2 22.4 19.3 5.8 
 Secondary 17.7 19.6 27.5 20.4 14.9 
 University/Technical 4.1 9.3 13.6 36.3 36.7 
 Meal at School 43.1 27.3 15.2 10.6 3.8 
 Free Textbooks 19.6 13.6 17.4 27.4 21.9 
Sources: 1World Bank (1996) Caribbean Countries Poverty Reduction and Human Resource 
Development in the Caribbean. Statistical Appendix Tables 32, 34 and 36. 
2World Bank (1999a) Jamaica Secondary Education. Statistical Appendix Table 4.11.    
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Table 2 shows the incidence of public education expenditures in Bangladesh, 
Indonesia and Pakistan.  The data in Table 2 reveal that public primary school 
spending is strongly pro-poor, but this pro-poor bias is reversed at the secondary   
and  tertiary  levels.  Total  spending  on  education  (i.e., aggregated  at  all levels) in 
 
Table 2   
Incidence of Public Education Expenditures in Bangladesh,  
Indonesia, and Pakistan 
(Percent) 
By Quintiles 
Country and Year 
Expenditure in 
Education I (Poorest) II III IV V (Richest) 
Bangladesh 20001       
 Primary Education 22 23 22 19 14 
 Secondary 6 11 16 28 40 
 Tertiary 6 6 10 21 57 
 All Public Education 
   Spending 12 15 17 23 32 
 Food for Education      
    Wheat 35 29 17 14 5 
    Rice 30 36 12 17 6 
Indonesia 19892       
 Primary 22 22 22 20 14 
 Junior Secondary 7 14 19 26 34 
 Senior Secondary 3 6 11 24 56 
 Tertiary 0 0 1 7 92 
 All Levels 15 17 18 20 29 
Pakistan 19912 All Levels 14 17 19 21 29 
Sources: 1Asian Development Bank (2002) Poverty in Bangladesh: Building on Progress. 
2Filmer (2003) The Incidence of Public Expenditures on Health and Education. 
 
Bangladesh, Indonesia and Pakistan is skewed toward the non-poor.  In their 
progression through the education system, students (particularly the poor) are 
screened out not just on the basis of merit but also because of their ability to bear the 
rising costs of secondary and higher education.  The Pratichi Research Team (2002) 
confirms the poor status of primary public education in India.4  Saigal (2002) 
summarises the key findings of the Pratichi report, which we reproduce.  First, while 
government teachers are paid several times the amount that Shishu Shiksha Kendras 
(SSKs-NGO-managed primary education centres), parent satisfaction is much lower 
for government teachers (41 percent) than for SSK teachers (54 percent).  Second, 
teachers in government schools tended to discriminate against certain students on the 
basis of caste and class.  Absenteeism was higher (at 75 percent) among teachers in 
schools with predominantly lower-class or caste students (the poor), then in schools 
 
4The problems facing primary education in India, we believe, are quite similar to Bangladesh and 
Pakistan.  In fact, the education problems in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan are quite similar. 
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where upper-classes dominated (33 percent).  Third, student attendance was higher 
and teacher absenteeism lower at SSK schools.  And, fourth, due to the poor quality 
of teaching in schools, many students feel compelled to seek private tutoring in 
addition to regular attendance.  This problem is pervasive in Guyana and in other 
developing countries. 
The data in Table 2 also reveal that the school-feeding programme in 
Bangladesh is well-targeted and pro-poor.  Tamil Nadu State introduced, for first 
time in India, a “noon-meal” programme for children in 1956.  Saigal (2002), in a 
review of the literature, reports that the school-feeding programme has increased 
average attendance and reduced drop out rates.  Moreover, children from “backward” 
and Muslim communities and poor children appear to benefit significantly.  Behrman 
(1996) reports that in the case of the Dominican Republic the top 20 percent of the 
income distribution received 76 percent of the government subsidies for higher 
education, while the lower 40 percent of the income distribution received only 2 
percent of the education subsidies; in Colombia, the top 20 percent of the income 
profile received 60 percent of the higher education subsidies, while the bottom 40 
percent of the income distribution received just 6 percent; and in Chile, the upper 20 
percent of the income groups captured 54 percent of the higher education subsidies, 
while the poorest 40 percent received only 13 percent.   In Ghana the richest 20 
percent of the households received 45 percent of the subsidies to tertiary education, 
while the poorest 20 percent households received only 6 percent of the tertiary 
education subsidies [World Bank (1999)]. In a review of the literature, Jimenes 
(1986, p. 119) concluded that in most developing regions children of white-collar 
“benefit disproportionately” from education subsidies receiving nearly “six times as 
much benefit as children of farmers”, and in Francophone Africa children from 
white-collar families “gain more than ten times as much from subsidies as farmers’ 
children”.  Lopez-Acevedo and Salinas (2000) report that in the case of Mexico the 
poor receive the bulk of the primary education subsidy, while expenditures at the 
tertiary level tend to favour the non-poor students in urban areas.  This is the 
situation in the Caribbean region.  The evidence for 39 countries summarised in 
Filmer (2003) and World Development Report 2004 (at page 32) shows that in all 
countries, on average, the poorest 20 percent of the population gain less than 20 
percent of the education subsidies, while the wealthiest 20 percent enjoy more than 
20 percent of the benefits of public spending on education.  The governments of the 
Caribbean and in other developing countries need to address the pro-rich bias of 
public expenditures at the post-secondary level and accord priority to quality 
improvements at both primary and secondary levels.  For example, it is reported that 
62.7 percent of the students who took the 2004 Secondary Schools Entrance 
Examination in Guyana would need remedial work when they move on to the 
secondary level [Stabroek News (11 July 2004)], and that 29 percent of the children 
who took the same examination have not been assigned secondary schools because 
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places were not available to accommodate them [Stabroek News (7 July 2004)].  In 
Jamaica, the World Bank (2003, p. 118) reported that the “sharp decline in 
enrollment of students after age 14, especially the poor, can be attributed to the lack 
of school places in Grades 10 and 11, as well as poor preparation in junior secondary 
education”. The regressive “patterns” of tertiary education are the result of inequities 
of basic education [Holm-Nielsen and Thom (2004)].  Students who can afford extra 
tutoring, books and supplies, and who can in most cases pay for high quality primary 
and secondary education, are better prepared to score well on university entrance 
examinations.  In these circumstances subsidised or free tertiary education would do 
very little to increase tertiary education participation of the poor, what is needed is to 
improve the quality of primary and secondary education.  A more effective strategy 
for increasing and broadening tertiary education would be to provide targeted 
assistance at the tertiary level, and focus on reducing the “at risk” students at the 
primary and secondary levels [LaRocque (2003)]. 
There is a pervasive brain drain from the Caribbean to the United States, and 
this migration accounts for a large share of the best educated.  Estimates by 
Carrington and Detragiache (1998) indicates that 56 percent and 41 percent of the 
migrants from Guyana to the United States had a secondary and tertiary level of 
schooling respectively; in the case of Jamaica 56 percent and 42 percent had a 
secondary and tertiary level education; and for Trinidad and Tobago 52 percent and 
46 percent possessed a secondary and tertiary level education.5  The IMF Carrington-
Detragiache study estimates that in the case of Guyana at least 77 percent of those 
with a university education migrated to the United States; and in the case of Trinidad 
and Tobago the estimate is 57.2 percent.6  The World Bank (2003) reports that about 
80 percent of the tertiary graduates in Jamaica in the 1990s have emigrated.  The 
most direct impact of skilled emigration is to reduce the number of educated and 
skilled workers in the Caribbean who are critical for productivity, economic 
development and social change.  Then there are the costs to the public treasury 
associated with training the workers and graduates who emigrate.  In the case of 
nurses who migrate, it is estimated that the Caribbean has been losing an average 
sum of US$15M annually in investment in the training of nurses [Stabroek News (13 
July 2004)].  Workers and university graduates who emigrate and remain abroad 
contribute money via worker remittances.  A United States Agency for International 
Development study reported in Stabroek News (8 November 2002) indicate that in 
1997 remittances to Guyana amounted to US$57 million, but by 2001 remittances 
increased significantly to US$92 million in 2001 or approximately 13 percent of 
Guyana’s GDP.  In the case of Jamaica, it is estimated that remittances from 
 
5The Carrington and Detragiache (1998) paper is based on the 1990 U.S. Population Census.  
Primary education in this study is defined as 0 to 8 years of schooling; secondary is 9 to 12 years; and 
tertiary level is 13 years and more. 
6Easterly (2001) claims that the estimate for Guyana is a “conservative estimate”. 
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overseas average about US$700 million per year for families that receive them 
[World Bank (2003)], which is about 8.3 percent of Jamaica’s GDP. 
The benefits of education accrue to individuals who are able to earn more and 
be gainfully employed.  Estimates by Psacharopoulos (1994) show that the private 
rates of return are higher than the social returns on education; second, primary 
education reflects the highest private and social returns worldwide; third, social rates 
of return for secondary and higher education are very close; and, fourth, private 
returns on higher education outstrip social rates of return.  Since the private rates of 
return on tertiary education have risen relative to primary and secondary education, 
and since most of the students enrolled at the tertiary level are from the non-poor, the 
higher private rates of return on tertiary education would “translate into higher 
returns on educational investment for richer families” [Holm-Nielsen and Thom 
(2004), p. 13].  This, as Holm-Nielsen and Thom argue is a “recipe” for producing 
more income inequalities.  There is a need for Caribbean governments to re-evaluate 
the policy of subsidised or free tertiary education.7  On this issue, the World Bank 
(2003, p. 120) argues: 
 In tertiary education, given its relatively high quality, the richer than average 
profile of those who attend, the high emigration rates, and the high private 
returns to education, increasing cost recovery would be desirable on both 
equity and efficiency grounds. 
 
Holm-Nielsen and Thom (2004) point out that public tertiary institutions in a number 
of Latin America and Caribbean countries are implementing cost sharing policies. 
Charging tuition to students (as presently exists at the University of Guyana and at 
the public universities in Jamaica) who can afford to pay or have access to credit will 
provide additional resources for tertiary education and ease the burden on the public 
treasury.  Any policy of cost sharing would ensure that the costs of higher education 
are borne by those who receive the benefits, but this ought to be tied to the ability to 
pay and the development of credit markets to enable students to finance their 
education.  Internationally the trend is towards allowing tertiary institutions to set 
fees.  The United Kingdom recently announced that universities would be allowed to 
increase and set their own fees.  During the 1990s, many Canadian provinces 
removed fee restrictions for professional programmes, and Australia has introduced 
greater flexibility in fee setting, with more to come [LaRocque (2003)].  Court 
(1999) points out that Makerere University in Uganda moved from the “brink of 
collapse” to a vibrant institution by encouraging privately sponsored students, 
 
7Barbados provides free tertiary education.  Recently there have been concerns about whether or 
not Barbados will be able to financially continue subsidising post-secondary education.  Moreover, 
arguments are raised at the international level about whether a policy of free tertiary education is 
consistent with “fair competition”.  As The Nation (14 June 2004) in its editorial points out that the United 
States is “very much behind the move to abandon such subsidies, by maintaining that education was a 
service and must compete internationally”.  
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commercialising service units, and institutionalising consultancy arrangements.  
Court reports that in the space of 5 years Makerere has moved from a situation where 
“none of the students paid fees to one over 70 percent do”.  Even if we disagree on 
the efficacy of fees for higher education (which we support on efficiency and equity 
grounds), the needs of the poor can still be met through student loan programmes, or 
means-tested financial aid and scholarship programmes.  These programmes do have 
a subsidy component, but they are preferable to across-the-board subsidised tertiary 
education because the subsidy of these programmes is targeted more closely to the 
source of market failure [Lopez-Acevedo and Salina (2000)].   
The U.S. has relied on a market-oriented model of higher education, while 
European universities are largely state-funded.  Germany justifies providing free 
university education on the grounds that it leads to universal access, but this is not so as 
most of the beneficiaries of its free university education are the non-poor.  America has 
17 of the world’s top universities out of 20 according to a recent ranking [The 
Economist (September 10th–16th, 2005)].  The market model of higher education has 
several advantages.  First, it is more flexible in combining equity with excellence [The 
Economist (September 10th–16th, 2005)].  The Economist points out that in the U.S. 
there is a larger proportion of ‘poor school-leavers’ going to college compared to 
Germany.  Second, the market model can produce world class quality universities right 
down to community colleges.  Third, as The Economist points out, the market-model is 
more sustainable than the public-sector model.  Indian universities are publicly funded, 
and the government does not have the resources to pay for expansion and 
improvements of its universities, but it does not have the political muscle to charge 
tuition.  The result, as The Economist, noted is that while enrollment doubled in the 
1990s from 4.9 million to 9.4 million, the overall quality of university education 
declined considerably.  China, on the other hand, has had the biggest university 
expansion in the 1990s that the world has ever seen and it has improved quality (some 
Chinese universities are today comparable to some of the very best in the world).  
China has achieved this by relying on the market mechanism—tuition is approximately 
26 percent of the revenues of public universities in China [The Economist (September 
10th–16th, 2005)].  Fourth, the market model of higher education allows universities to 
serve “many masters” and give them more control of their destiny than relying on the 
state [The Economist (September 10th–16th, 2005)]. 
The state should encourage and facilitate private expansion of tertiary 
education in the Caribbean and developing countries.  This would help to promote 
competition, improve the quality of higher education, meet the needs of students and 
the labour market, and ease the fiscal burden.  It can be argued that public subsidies 
for higher education are needed to produce the cadre of skills that are needed for 
increased productivity, economic growth, good governance and to be competitive in 
a global economy.  In the Caribbean, the demand for higher skills, especially for 
workers with a tertiary education (which is in short supply) is rising faster than 
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demand for less skilled (poor) workers, and this demand for educated workers has 
bid up their relative wages thereby leading to widening wage inequality.  The severe 
shortage of skilled and educated workers in the Caribbean has placed a constraint on 
technology transfer and growth.  Hence, this provides a valid reason for the state to 
be involved in higher education, but it does not have to be heavily subsidised or free.   
 
3.  HEALTH EXPENDITURES 
The state in the Caribbean is the major provider of health care.  Financing of 
public health care in the Caribbean is done through the national budget.  As a share 
of GDP, public expenditures on health care in the Caribbean are as follows: 
Barbados 3.2 percent, Guyana 3 percent, Haiti 1.8 percent, Jamaica 3.1 percent, and 
Trinidad and Tobago 3 percent.  Private health expenditures account for nearly 20 
percent of total health expenditures in Guyana, 47 percent in Barbados, 63 percent in 
Jamaica, and 41 percent in Trinidad and Tobago [Gafar (2003)]. 
Jamaica health care system is designed around the primary health care 
approach, where primary health care is the initial point of contact [King (2001)].  
Secondary and tertiary care (curative care) are provided in hospitals on a referral 
basis.  The poor relies heavily on primary health care in Jamaica.  King (2001) notes 
that the share of the total health budget allocated to primary care has been declining.  
In Trinidad and Tobago, despite the emphasis on primary care, resources have been 
increasingly allocated to hospitals; with the ratio of expenditures increasing from 5 
to 1 to 10 to 1 in the 1980s [Swaroop (1996, 1997)].  In Guyana the public health 
care system is based on a five-tiered structure and an upward-moving referral system 
consisting of health posts, health centres, district hospitals, regional hospitals and 
national hospitals [IDB (2004)].  Lack of resources has led to a deterioration of the 
health infrastructure (particularly at the health post and health centre levels), and 
several health facilities (at the lower level) lack personnel, drugs and basic 
equipment [IDB (2004)].  The World Bank (2002, p. 39) notes that in Guyana, even 
“within the public system, the poor are turning more and more often to hospitals for 
treatment as a result of increasing dissatisfaction with the services provided in the 
lower level facilities”.  As a result, many poor patients have to travel long distances 
to seek medical care (at the public hospitals) or pay high fees to private doctors 
which they cannot afford.  This “run to quality” (hospitals) increases the costs of 
providing public health.  The World Bank (1994) reports that, in Guyana, there exists 
a “bias” in allocating resources toward “high cost curative” (hospital) care.  One 
reason why governments spend a significant share of the health budget on hospitals 
and tertiary health services is that there is no well-developed health insurance market 
in the Caribbean.  As the data in Table 3 show this allocation of public spending to 
hospitals conflicts with equity considerations.  The World Bank (2002, p. 39) has 
also noted that, in the case of Guyana, “there is a “second layer” access problem 
within public facilities: poor patients receive treatment from medical staff less often 
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than better-off patients”.  Experience shows that spending on social services may not 
translate into more or better services for the poor because programmes for poor 
people are generally neglected, under-funded, and too often are of low quality 
[World Bank (2003a)]. 
Table 3 shows the type of health facilities used by those persons ill/injured 
and seeking care in Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago.  The data 
summarised in Table 3 show that the poor rely heavily on public health care facilities 
(e.g. public health centres and public health posts), and the wealthier households are 
more likely to use private care and private hospitals.  There is an urban bias 
associated with health spending in the Caribbean: health clinics and health posts are 
located in the rural areas, while hospitals are predominantly located in urban areas.  
In Guyana, approximately 70 percent of the doctors practice in Georgetown, the 
capital, where a quarter of the population lives [Gafar (2003)]. 
 
Table 3  
Health Care Utilisation in Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago 
Quintiles 
Country (Poorest) II III IV V Total 
Guyana, 19931       
Type of Facility (%)       
Public Hospital 24 39 32 32 29 31 
Public Health Centre 21 9 9 13 9 12 
Public Health Post 16 5 1 2 3 5 
Private Hospital 1 13 12 17 16 12 
Private Clinic 2 3 4 3 9 5 
Private Doctor 10 23 24 24 23 21 
Industrial Health Centre 3 2 5 6 5 5 
Others 23 6 13 3 6 9 
Jamaica, 19982       
Source of Care       
Private 36 46 57 58 78 58 
Public 59 49 40 35 17 38 
Both 5 5 3 7 5 5 
Level of Care       
Primary 60 63 71 65 73 67 
Outpatient 35 31 26 31 23 29 
Both Primary and 
Outpatient 5 6 3 4 4 5 
Hospitalisation 10 10 7 7 7 8 
Trinidad and Tobago, 19923       
Private 43 52 55 68 61 55 
Public 57 48 45 37 39 45 
Sources: 1World Bank (1994) Guyana: Strategies for Reducing Poverty, Table 4.2, p. 55. 
2Planning Institute of Jamaica (1999) Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions, Tables C-3 and  C-5. 
3World Bank (1996a) Trinidad and Tobago: Poverty and Unemployment in an Oil Based 
Economy, Table 27, p.129.  
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Primary and outpatient care account for 60 percent and 35 percent 
respectively of the level of care in Jamaica.  In Guyana, 29 percent of the wealthy 
use public hospitals compared to 24 percent of the poorest, and 16 percent of the 
poorest ill/injured seeking care went to a private provider compared to 53 percent for 
the richest quintile.  Approximately two-thirds of those ill and seeking care in 
Guyana were seen by a doctor; for the poorest only one-third were treated by a 
doctor while almost half received care from a community health worker, nurse, 
dispenser, pharmacist, midwife, healer or Medex whose level of training is well 
below that of a doctor [World Bank (1994)].  In short, richer groups in the Caribbean 
are more likely to obtain care when sick, to be seen by a doctor, and to receive 
medicines when they are ill, than poorer groups. 
Table 4 shows the utilisation rates of government health services in 
Bangladesh.  The data in Table 4 reveals that targeting of the poor with prenatal care 
and immunisation services has been successful—in fact the utilisation rates for the 
poor and the non-poor are almost the same.  On average, the Asian Development 
Bank (2002) notes that in Bangladesh only 2 percent of urban and 1.7 percent of 
rural residents visited the public health care facilities for curative care; and in urban 
areas the poor tend to use public health care facilities more than the non-poor, and in 
rural areas the opposite is true.  In Bangladesh the efficiency of the public health care 
system is compromised because government doctors are allowed private practices.  
This practice suggests that government doctors have weak incentives to increase 
their productivity in their government jobs and to treat poor patients particularly 
when these government doctors can earn more by selling their services to private 
patients.  In many instances, poor patients are forced to pay doctors for routine 
treatment otherwise they (patients) are left unattended for long hours.  Moreover, if 
(as is likely) government doctors treat private patients during official hours of work, 
then the government doctors in Bangladesh are ‘misappropriating’ part of the public 
health subsidy ear-marked for the poor. 
 
Table 4 
Utilisation Rates of Government Health Care Services in Bangladesh in 2000 
Urban Rural All 
% of Individuals Seeking Care from Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor 
Curative Care       
  Health Facilities 2.4 1.8 1.2 2.3 1.4 2.1 
  Government Doctors in Private Practices 2.1 4.3 1.4 3.8 1.5 3.9 
Maternal Health       
  Pre-natal Services 30.4 28.9 30.6 28.1 30.6 8.3 
  Deliveries 3.1 9.1 1.7 2.8 1.9 4.4 
  Post-natal Services   5.1 8.1 4.2 5.8 4.3 6.4 
Immunisations       
  Government Facility or Worker 87.4 88.0 88.7 91.3 88.6 90.3 
Source: Asian Development Bank (2002) Poverty in Bangladesh: Building on Progress. Table 3.8. 
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In Guatemala 39 percent of the poorest seeking care went to a private provider 
compared to 76 percent for the richest quintile; in South Africa 37 percent of the 
poorest sought care from a private provider compared to 83 percent from the richest; 
and in Thailand 8 percent of the poorest seeking care went to private providers 
compared to 27 percent for the richest quintile [Makinen, et al. (2000)].  The data in 
Table 3 indicate that the poor in the Caribbean, like in most developing countries, are 
at a distinct disadvantage in terms of availability and accessibility of quality health 
services. 
 
4.  BENEFIT-INCIDENCE OF PUBLIC HEALTH CARE SPENDING 
The benefit-incidence of public health care spending by quintiles is 
summarised in Table 5.  The detailed information for Guyana suggests two clear 
messages: first, lower spending versus hospital care tends to be pro-poor; and 
second, hospital spending is not equitably distributed.  Hospital and curative care 
in the Caribbean are utilised more by the non-poor.  This is the experience of 
most developing countries [Filmer, et al. (1997)].  The data for Guyana reveal 
that the non-poor are the main beneficiaries of subsidised medicines.  With 
regard to pharmaceuticals, the severe shortage of essential drugs in most clinics 
in Guyana has forced patients to buy their own medicines.  The World Bank 
(1994) reported that in Guyana, while 43 percent of the population bought 
medicines for illness nationally, only 20 percent of the poor were able to do so.  
The poorest groups in the Caribbean and in developing countries tend to live in 
the rural areas and have to travel farther to health clinics.  Most of the transport 
costs are borne by the user, which limits the ability of the poor to access public 
health care.  Second, the lines and waiting time at public health facilities tend to 
be considerably long, and this forces many poor patients into not seeking the 
services.  The time loss from economic activity represents much greater 
opportunity costs for the poor, who unlike the non-poor that are salaried workers, 
have to give up income or not be able to tend to the farms and animals in order to 
obtain medical services [Castro-Leal, et al. (2000)].  Third, there is the issue of 
informal fees and bribes that patients, especially in Guyana, must make for these 
services.  Fourth, many government doctors, especially in Guyana, conduct a 
private practice during official work hours, charging fees substantially higher 
than the official ones, and using public equipment and supplies.  In these 
circumstances, access of the poor to public health care expenditures is naturally 
reduced.  One way to deal with the inequities in the health care system is to 
charge more for government health services used by the non-poor.  Another way 
is to use the state’s legal authority to develop alternative, self-financed 
mechanisms though which the non-poor can obtain services at their own expense 
[Gwatkin (2003)]. 
John Gafar 94
Table 5   
Quintiles’ Shares of Beneficiaries of Public Health Expenditures in Guyana, 
Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago 
Quintiles 
Country I (Poorest) II III IV V 
Guyana      
  First Health Consultation      
  Public Hospital 19.2 22.5 18.1 28.2 12.1 
  Public Health Centre 28.0 15.8 20.7 21.7 13.8 
  Public Health Post 67.0 2.6 7.0 16.4 7.1 
  Public Medicines 18.1 7.4 11.0 31.3 32.2 
Jamaica      
  Public Hospital 19.1 17.5 23.0 22.6 17.7 
  Public Health Centre 25.2 30.4 15.6 17.7 11.1 
Trinidad and Tobago      
  Public Hospital 16.7 23.4 25.2 16.1 18.6 
  Public Health Centre 8.1 34.7 14.2 7.1 36.0 
Source:  World Bank (1996) Caribbean Countries Poverty Reduction and Human Resource Development 
in the Caribbean. Statistical Appendix Tables 32, 34 and 35. 
 
Table 6 presents the benefit incidence of public expenditures on health in 
Bangladesh and India.  The Asian Development Bank (2002) reports that the share of 
public expenditures accruing to the poor is 45 percent, while share of the population is 
50 percent, and their share of overall income is 26 percent.  Spending on child health in 
Bangladesh is pro-poor, partly because poor households tend to have more children.  
On the other hand, spending on curative care is rather regressive.  There are two 
reasons why poor households’ share of public health subsidies is low.  The first relate 
to the fees charged for service.  In-as-much as the official fees charged in public health 
care facilities are not burdensome for the poor, the informal fees required in the same 
health care facilities are comparable or even higher than the official ones [Asian 
Development Bank (2002)].  The second reason relates to the fact that government 
doctors engaged in private practice charge fees above those for service in other types of 
facilities, including the private [Asian Development Bank (2002)].  This, therefore, 
reduces the access of the poor to publicly funded health services. 
The data in Table 6 also reveal that publicly founded curative health services in 
India benefit the non-poor more.  The richest quintile in India also benefits more from 
hospital services.  Spending on child care (immunisations) in India is pro-poor.  In 
India the poorest quintile receives 10 percent of the public health care subsidies, while 
the richest quintile receives nearly a third of the total public health care subsidies.  The 
distribution of private health care services in India is even more skewed in favour of 
the non-poor.  In a review of literature, Saigal (2002) reports that public health services 
in urban areas were “more equitably” used than those in rural areas. 
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Table 6   
Incidence of Public Expenditures on Health in Bangladesh and India 
(Percent) 
Quintiles 
Country Expenditure Type I (Poorest) II III IV V(Richest) 
Bangladesh 20001 Child Health 23 21 19 18 18 
 Family Planning and  
  Control of  
  Communicable Diseases 18 18 19 19 24 
 Limited Curative Care 11 21 22 18 28 
 Maternal Health 20 13 20 18 29 
 All Health Expenditures 16 19 21 18 26 
India 1995-962 Curative Care 10 13 18 26 33 
 Hospital Inpatient 11 13 20 25 31 
 Hospital Outpatient 8 12 17 27 36 
 Immunisations 24 22 22 19 14 
 All Health Expenditures 10 14 18 25 32 
Sources:  1Asian Development Bank (2002) Poverty in Bangladesh: Building on Progress, Table 3.10. 
2Filmer (2003) The Incidence of Public Expenditures on Health and Education. World Bank.  
 
Fogel and Lee (2003) report that numerous studies confirm that the disparities 
in various measures of health between the “privileged” and the “deprived” still 
remain wide, even in rich countries, and that researchers have shown that the 
disparities between the poor and non-poor are actually increasing.  Fogel and Lee 
(2003) also report that researchers have found that in China the gap in levels of 
health between urban and rural residents widened between 1985 and 1993 in spite of 
rapid economic growth.8  This disparity in health outcomes is also evident in India.  
Jalan and Ravallion (2001) in review of the literature noted that only 29 percent of 
the poorest quintile of families in rural India in 1991-93 used oral rehydration 
therapy when a child had diarrhoea, as compared to 50 percent in the richest quintile.  
Jalan and Ravallion also report that 52 percent of those in the poorest quintile in 
India sought medical care, as compared to 78 percent in the richest quintile. 
Mehrotva and Delamonica (2002) examined the egalitarian impact of public 
health expenditures on children.  In their study they divided the countries analysed 
according to the level of child mortality: very high (above 140 deaths per 1000 live 
births), high (between 70 and 140 deaths per 1000 live births), and medium (less 
than 70 deaths per 1000 live births).  Mehrotva and Delamonica found that in 
countries with mortality rates below 70, the poorest 20 percent of the population 
received more than 25 percent of the health care subsidies, and in countries where 
the mortality rates exceed 140 the poorest quintile received less than 15 percent of 
the public health care subsidies.  In most developing countries the distribution of 
 
8Our experience suggests that this is the situation in Guyana and Jamaica, but we do not have the 
data to support this observation. 
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public education and health expenditures strongly favour the urban areas.  In Kenya, 
for example, where 70 percent of the population lives in the rural areas, only 13 
percent of the public health spending is allocated to rural health services [Mehrotva 
and Delamonica (2002)]. 
The evidence for 26 developing countries summarised in Filmer (2003) and 
World Development Report 2004 clearly shows that the poorest fifth of the 
population receives less than a fifth of the health expenditures, while the richest fifth 
receives much more.  The evidence amassed in Filmer (2003) also shows that public 
spending on primary care tends to be more pro-poor than overall spending.  For 
example, statistics reported by Castro-Leal, et al. (2000), and summarised in 
Gwatkin (2001, 2003), show that in Ghana the richest quintile received 32 percent of 
the benefit incidence of public spending on health compared to 12 percent for the 
poorest quintile; in Guinea the richest quintile captured 48 percent of the public 
health subsidies while the poorest quintile received only 1 percent; in Tanzania the 
richest quintile received 29 percent of the benefits of public spending on health while 
the poorest quintile received only 17 percent; and in Indonesia and Vietnam the 
richest quintile received 29 percent of the public health subsidies while the poorest 
quintile received 12 percent.  Gwatkin notes that, on average, the wealthiest 20 
percent of Africa’s population received 30 percent of the total health care benefits, 
while the poorest quintile received only 12 percent.  In the case of primary care, 
Africa’s richest quintile got 23 percent of the health benefits, while the poorest 
quintile received just 12 percent. 
 
5.  INFRASTRUCTURE SPENDING 
World Development Report 1994 argues that good infrastructure is essential 
for growth, for increasing productivity and lowering of costs and poverty; and that a 
one percent increase in the stock of infrastructure is associated with a one percent 
increase in GDP across countries.  Estache, Foster and Woodom (2001) point out 
that evidence from Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela indicates that a 10 
percent increase in infrastructure stocks has been found to lead to an 1.5 percent 
increase in GDP, and that a one percent point of growth in Latin America reduces the 
number of people living in poverty by half a percent point.  Estache, et al. also point 
out that there is evidence from Argentina and Brazil that differentials in 
infrastructure stocks (such as roads and access to sanitation) have been a “significant 
impediment” to “convergence” between rich and poor regions over the last 20 years.  
Subsidising infrastructure (for example water and electricity) provision is generally 
recommended as a means of redistributing incomes to the poor.  However, the 
effectiveness of such programmes depends on how the benefits of infrastructure 
spending are distributed.  Table 7 presents the benefit incidence associated with 
infrastructure spending in the Caribbean.  
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Table 7  
Quintiles’ Shares of Public Spending on Public Utilities in Guyana, 
 Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago 
Quintiles 
Country I (Poorest) II III IV V 
Guyana: Public Services      
  Electricity Connection 9.4 15.5 19.4 24.4 31.3 
  Sewer Connection 4.7 13.2 17.6 19.9 44.6 
  Piped Water, House 11.1 10.1 17.2 22.2 39.4 
  Piped Water, Yard 8.3 15.7 21.8 25.9 28.4 
  Other Public Source 21.2 25.5 20.7 19.0 13.6 
Jamaica: Public Utilities      
  Sewer Connection 10.6 8.4 20.3 23.6 37.1 
  Water Connection, Indoor 5.8 9.1 20.7 25.3 39.1 
  Public Standpipe 28.7 27.9 17.0 17.5 8.9 
  Electricity Connection 11.6 15.7 21.6 24.1 27.0 
Trinidad and Tobago:  
  Public Utilities 
     
  Sewer Connection 5.7 11.9 12.8 18.7 50.8 
  Piped Water, Indoor 6.5 12.4 18.9 24.1 38.1 
  Piped Water, Outdoor 19.8 24.0 16.4 20.4 19.3 
  Electricity Connection 10.5 16.0 19.1 22.5 32.0 
Source: World Bank (1996) Caribbean Countries: Poverty Reduction and Human Resource Development  
in the Caribbean. Statistical Appendix Tables 32, 34 and 35. 
 
The data in Table 7 show that, like education and health, infrastructure 
spending is failing poor people.  Electricity, sewer and piped water connection are 
mainly concentrated in urban areas.  The data in Table 7 show that the richest 
quintile in Guyana received around 3.3 times the electricity subsidies that the poorest 
quintile received; in the case of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago the corresponding 
figures are 2.3 times and 3.1 times, respectively.  In the case of sewer connection the 
subsidies that the richest quintile received relative to the poorest quintile are as 
follows: Guyana 9.5 times, Jamaica 3.5 times and Trinidad and Tobago 8.9 times.  
And in the case of piped water indoor the richest quintile in Guyana received 3.5 
times the subsidies that the poorest quintile received; for Jamaica and Trinidad and 
Tobago the ratios are 6.7 times and 5.9 times, respectively.  The evidence clearly 
shows that being poor in the Caribbean reduces the chances of getting connected to 
these infrastructure services, and that there is an urban bias to infrastructure 
spending.  However, in the urban shantytowns, populated by the poor, there is a lack 
of decent infrastructure.   
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Efforts to raise the incomes of the poor and reduce poverty are not going to 
succeed in developing countries unless the poor do have access to the most basic 
services of all: water, roads, electricity, communications, good schools and health 
care.  In developing countries, diseases attributed to environmental factors (such as 
water borne diseases, malaria etc.) are associated with the lack of infrastructure 
[World Bank (2002a)].  World Development Report 2004 makes the point that poor 
people bear a “disportionate share” of the impact of inefficient water and sanitation 
services; that fewer poor people are connected to electricity, water and sanitation 
services; that when poor people have access, the installation has to be shared among 
many more people; and that the prices the poor pay for these services are generally 
more than those paid by rich households who are connected to piped water, 
electricity and sanitation services.  Many low-income households do not have the 
funds and access to credit to pay heavy initial connection costs to public services 
(electricity and water).  World Development Report 1994 at page 31 notes: “Many 
countries have introduced subsidies through low tariffs with the aim of improving 
the poor’s access to infrastructure services, but most of these subsidies have been 
captured by middle- and high-income households”.  The problem is that once a basic 
infrastructure network exists, it is usually cheaper to connect households in urban 
areas than to connect households in rural areas.  The poor are predominantly located 
in the rural areas which reduces their access to infrastructure services.   
The World Bank (2001) points out that in Croatia in 1998 more than 90 
percent of the energy subsidies went to the non-poor households; in Russia in 1997 
approximately three quarters of the water subsidies went to middle- and upper-
income households; and in Bangladesh the better off households received around 6 
times the infrastructure subsidies that the poor received.  The World Bank (2002a) 
reports that in Guatemala, households that are connected with electricity pay less 
than 10 US cents per kilowatt hour, those households that are not connected to the 
electricity system and rely on candles, wick lamps and power appliances with dry 
cell batteries pay the equivalent of US$5 per kilowatt hour; in Haiti, households with 
piped water connections pay US$1 per cubic meter, those without connection pay 
US$10 per cubic meter because they have to go to vendors; and in Nepal, a person 
would spend about US$4 in transportation costs to get access to a phone, in villages 
that have phones, it costs 10 US cents per call.  The evidence clearly shows that the 
poor are paying for infrastructure services, and they are willing to pay [World Bank 
(2002a)].   
The World Bank (2003b) points out that in Pakistan the poor have relatively 
low access to safe drinking water and sanitation services; they are less likely to use 
“closed sources of drinking water” and be connected to a drainage system; and they 
are less likely to be connected to electricity.  In rural Pakistan the water supply is a 
major problem—young girls waste a lot of time just fetching water which means that 
they are not educated.  Not being educated is a cause of their poverty.  Bangladesh 
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remains far from having universal access to electricity, 19 percent of rural 
households in 2000 have electricity connection compared to 80 percent for urban 
households [Asian Development Bank (2002), Table 2.10].  In Bangladesh only 12 
percent of the poorest quintile have electricity connection, compared to 55 percent 
for the richest quintile. 
Infrastructure provision should be sensitive to poverty reduction priorities.  
But to realise infrastructure potential in contributing to poverty reduction the policy 
maker must have a clear understanding of the nature and dimensions of poverty.  
Poverty in the developing countries is predominantly rural; hence, the provision of 
rural roads and irrigation would have to be an integral part of any public investment 
programme.  The critical issue becomes how to expand access to, and delivery of the 
right type of infrastructure services that benefit the poor.  The World Bank (1994a) 
argues that measures such as regulated and depressed prices tend to deter expansion 
of infrastructure services.   
The weight of the cumulative evidence is that public spending on education, 
health and infrastructure in the developing countries is certainly not progressive 
and pro-poor, but rather regressive and urban-biased.  What can the governments 
do to improve the distributive effect of public spending?  In this context, targeting 
may prove to be a viable policy option.  However, targeting involves both 
efficiency and political economy considerations [van de Walle (1998)].  The 
middle class and the wealthy in the developing countries are the main beneficiaries 
of social spending, and any policy aimed at redirecting public expenditures 
towards the poor would be at the expense of the non-poor.  Expenditures on 
programmes that target the poor are perceived as pro-poor (“give away”) 
programmes for which there is very little political support in the Caribbean and the 
developing countries to sustain them since the poor lack political muscle.  Once 
targeting becomes a policy instrument, there arises a conflict between equity and 
efficiency.  Ravallion (2003) argues that problems of information and incentives 
are at the heart in designing any targeting policy.  Ravallion concludes that theory 
and evidence show that carefully designed transfer programmes can be an 
“effective tool” against poverty.  Targeting can be achieved by “broad targeting” in 
the form of spending that reach across-the-board in the society (for example, 
universal primary education or basic health care), or ‘narrow targeting’ where 
methods to identify the poor are used to benefit disproportionately the poor 
[Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott (2003)].  Narrow targeting makes sense when funds 
are limited.  The primary issue in designing and implementing any targeting 
mechanisms is how to deliver programme benefits in a way that is economically 
efficient.  Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott examined 122 targeted anti-poverty 
interventions from 48 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, Eastern 
Europe and the Former Soviet Union, the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-
Saharan Africa, and South and East Asia.  They report that the median targeted 
John Gafar 100
programme is progressive in that it transfers 25 percent more to poor individuals 
(bottom two quintiles).  They find that interventions that use means testing, 
geographic targeting, and self-selection based on work requirement are “all 
associated with an increased share of benefits going to the bottom two quintiles” 
[Coady, et al. (2003), p. 5].  They also find that self-selection of beneficiaries 
based on consumption and demographic targeting to the elderly show “limited 
potential for good targeting”.  Targeting difficulties cannot be solved by simply 
reallocating the subsidy (for example, allocating more funds to primary education 
or to primary health care), but there is a need to explicitly take into account in 
designing these programmes the various constraints facing the poor that limit their 
ability to take advantage of the education, health and infrastructure subsidies. 
Carefully designed transfer programmes that are economically and 
administratively efficient, are effective instruments to reach the poor.  Badly 
designed safety nets programmes can be a drain on the treasury.  The Jamaican 
school-feeding programme is designed to select beneficiaries on the basis of the 
food provided.  van de Walle (1998) estimates that the Jamaican school feeding 
programme costs 2.60 Jamaican dollars to achieve a gain of 1.00 Jamaican dollar 
per child.  Targeting can also lead to behavioural changes and distort incentives.  
For example, generous unemployment benefits may reduce the effort to find a job; 
moreover, if a social programme has an income limit, it may discourage some 
people from working hard and force them to earn less (take more leisure) in order 
to take advantage of the benefits of the social programme. 
 
7.  CONCLUSION 
There are some broad findings worth re-stating.  First, the education system in 
the Caribbean is not pro-poor, however, it does provide access to the majority of the 
people up to the secondary level.  Second, the non-poor are the principal 
beneficiaries of tertiary and university education subsidies in the developing 
countries.  Third, school feeding programmes are well targeted.  Fourth, the poor rely 
heavily on the inferior public health care facilities, while the wealthier households 
use private care and private hospitals.  Sixth, lower level health spending versus 
hospital care tends to be pro-poor; while hospital spending and the provision of 
public medicines are not well targeted.  Seventh, the evidence shows that 
expenditures on infrastructure spending tend to benefit the non-poor 
disproportionately more than the poor.  Finally, the statistics show that spending on 
basic services, to wit, primary and secondary education and basic health care benefit 
the poor.  Increasing the share of public expenditures on these services is warranted.  
Expenditures on tertiary education, hospitals and infrastructure are not progressive 
and pro-poor, but, rather regressive.  The non-poor should pay more for tertiary 
education, health care costs and infrastructure connections thereby freeing up 
resources for basic health care, and primary and secondary education.   
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